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Abstract 
In the context of Romania’s accession to the European Union, there was implied responsibility to adapt the 
country’s legislative and judicial system to European system in order to implement the legal standards created and adopted by 
the European Union. This was transplanted adaptation which aimed, more clearly, for a potential unification and 
standardization of the Member States’ legal systems. Against the background of this transplantation and adaptation, 
legislative and judicial national systems encountered a series of practical difficulties. In considering the diversity and 
particularity of a new European legal system, there were, even, reactions of rejecting some of the European legal norms of 
transplantation. Extending the law’s area of substantive procedures was a result of mutations of the Members States’ legal 
systems by creating a new European legal order. Identifying and eliminating the negative effects of defective transplantation 
of European legal standards might lead to prevention of the national legal system’s possible legislative and legal vulnerability. 
If, the legal system’s causes and negative effects considered by European Union to be a lacunary, could be identified, a series 
of solutions could be found which would improve the national legal system’s functions and, which, in a certain period, could 
eliminate forever the system’s difficulties. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea, of a peaceful organization of the type of modern Europe, appeared on numerous occasions. 
However, it was never taken into consideration by those who held power and who chose only between two 
policies: dominance; or equilibrium. As Cartou (1991) indicated, the idea of European unity of Europe was 
considered to be very old. It originated in the Antiquity when the roman conquests were considered to be the 
manifestations of such trends.  
 The European Economic Communities Treaty created its own legislative system; this was integrated 
into the Member States’ legislative systems and was binding before the national courts. Subjects, of the 
legislative system, were not only Member States but, also, their citizens, European Union legislation was 
directed, also, to initiate certain rights which became part of their legal patrimony.  
These rights resulted not only when they were granted expressly by the Treaty but, also, by virtue of 
obligations. The Treaty imposed these obligations in a clearly defined manner both to individuals and on the 
Member States and European Institutions, Voicu (2005) indicated that. 
The Court of Justice of European Union was the European Institution which represented the interests of 
law. It presented, itself, as a national jurisdiction, invested by the European Union with all the components 
necessary to achieve the law. Also, it cooperated with national jurisdictions to ensure uniform interpretation and 
application of European law. Consequently, this gave rise to European jurisprudence as the main source of 
European Union law which was applied to all Member States. 
Amongst all disciplines, the science of law was the most affected by this process of the world’s 
continued unification. This was because science of law ought to be updated continuously so that it could cover as 
many of the new aspects of contemporary social life. This was because new areas; new domains of law; new 
methods and strategies of application or the techniques of regulation, were being implemented permanently. 
Therefore, in cases, these could reach many of those which were fiction previously and, currently, became an 
acquis.  
By it specific objective, science of law obtained, now, a very special importance which, in the 
perspective of globalization, determined the necessary research of state and of law. It was increasingly evident 
that the state and the law were no longer depicted in the same values as ten or twenty years ago. In these 
circumstances, the science of law transcended a particular nation state’s borders and rules of organization. These 
could be useful elsewhere and those, from elsewhere, might be useful to a particular state. 
2. The Concept of Legal Transplant 
In this context, the concept of legal transplant appeared and what it could mean to particular states. It 
could replace, with a system or parts of it, coming from a assumed system as a somewhat higher and healthy 
system, all or part of a system of law or part of such a system, which proved to be obsolete. The beneficiary of 
the legal transplant, named the receiver, assigned it the quality of the donor’s system, with the final purpose of 
enriching and treating the system of law which was either obsolete or defective. Consequently, the national legal 
systems were compatible with the transnational system of law and, inevitably, with the international system of 
law.  
Generally, the legal transplantation was understood to be a transfer, across the geopolitical and cultural 
borders, of power and the institutional structures. This might be imposed or voluntary; this included legal whole 
systems or single legal principles. Also, it proposed to be integrated in similar or different cultures. In receiving 
countries, legal transfers could penetrate the notion of state of law or non-state social institutions. Alternatively, 
by being superimposed on indigenous juridical structures, many developing countries implemented it in the 
state’s supreme law. 
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A feature of legal transplant was that it involved a legal system which incorporated a legal norm; either 
the institution or the doctrine adopted from another legal system. It could refer, also, to the reception of a whole 
legal system; this could appear in a centralized manner. In order to understand the phenomenon, of legal 
transplantation of a foreign legal norm, there had to be an examination of the existing historical premises around 
the introduction of foreign law in a particular case. For example, if this was the result of conquest; colonial 
expansion; or political influence the successful state’s legal norm was adopted.  
Goodman (1995) indicated that, the concept of legal transplant was not new because, over millennia, 
the legal systems, from around the world, developed through legal transfers. As shown in the documents, some of 
the best legal transplants were held during the military expansion of the Roman Empire. In the opinion of Barry 
(1962) and Goodman (1995), the roman jurists assimilated jus gentium, which ought to apply to colonized 
persons, with jus naturale (the law which ought to be respected by all humanity). They considered that the 
universal laws of nature were capable of the linguistic culture through universal legal codes. Their conviction 
was that the differences between legal systems, which denied the universal attributes of the people and codes of 
natural laws and based on the roman morality, were superimposed on the indigenous cultural beliefs and 
practices. 
3. Dualism and Monism of European Union law 
 Based on the relationships between international law and national laws, the relationships between 
European Union law and national law could be constructed and elucidated. This started from the existence of two 
theories about the integration of international law in a national legal order: the dualism and the monism. 
Dualism was a theory which argued that the international and the national legal order were equal but 
completely independent and separate; these coexisted in parallel, Fuerea Augustin (2006) indicated that, there 
was no subordinate relationship between the two systems. 
Monism was a theory which considered that the rule of national law was in the same sphere as that 
international law and there existed a report of supra / subordination, depending on the variant adopted. This 
theory considered that national law was derived from international law. 
The institutive Treaties established monism and required Member States to respect European Union law. 
European Union rules of law were integrated into Member States’ national laws. They did not have the 
possibility to choose between dualism and monism; in accordance with the provisions from the judgment Enel 
against Costa from 1964 monism was obligatory. 
European Union law conferred rights and obligations not only on Member States but, also, certain direct 
rules were subjected on the citizens and enterprises. Firstly, it was part of the Member States’ legal systems to 
apply these regulations correctly. Therefore, any citizen, of the European Union Member States, ought to be 
entitled to expect that as European citizens, national authorities would apply their rights correctly throughout the 
European Union. 
4. Some Negative Effects of Incorrect Legal Transplantation of Norms imposed by the European 
Union. 
The relationship between European law and national law was not deprived of conflict between European 
and national norms. This type of situation occurred always when the European norm conferred rights and / or 
directly imposed obligations on European Union citizens and, at the same time, through its content, entering into 
conflict with a rule of national law. In solving this seemingly simple problem hid two fundamental principles, for 
building the European Union, were that their applicability depended on the very existence of European legal 
order. It was about direct applicability of the European Union law (direct effect) and of the prevalence of a 
normal European national rule in relation to a primauté. Any Member State’s incorrect transplantation of the 
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legality of the norms, imposed by the European Union, could lead to extensive vulnerabilities both in the 
legislative area and in the jurisdictional area. The practical inconvenience was reflected mainly in the act of 
realization of this law’s enactment producing a series of difficulties. 
In existing cases not only of an incomplete and interpretable legal framework but, also, of contradictory 
and diverse legal practice, cases, pending before the courts, acquired a greater degree of complexity. This would 
lead to the need for a more thorough and comprehensive judicial investigation which would require a longer time 
until such time as the court would be able to deliberate. This created tension and dissatisfaction amongst litigants. 
In this sense, one could exemplify the ECHR decision in the case of Burdov vs. Russia. This referred to a ECHR 
judgment from 2009 where, in reasoning the judgment, the ECHR said that there was a strong, but relative, 
presumption that excessively long processes gave rise to moral prejudices. Therefore, extending the duration, in 
resolving of the cases, would lead to overloading of courts. Such circumstances were capable of creating tension 
and overstressing amongst judicial authorities which would lead to the susceptibility of impairing their capacities 
to exercise their activities in conditions of maximum efficiency for the application of law and respect of seekers 
of justice. However, the fact that the court cases became more complex and decisions were rendered, after longer 
periods of time, led to inefficiency in resolving them. Related to the fact that, in Romanian law, the court was not 
bound by reasoning and judgments, given previously in identical or similar cases, the adopted solutions might be 
amongst the most diverse and, therefore, unpredictable. The in unitary practice, at the Supreme Court level, was 
to reason that, according to the provisions of ECHR judgment from 2007, the ECHR had condemned Romania, 
whilst the unpredictability, of the solutions adopted by the Romanian courts, was one of the ECHR’s main 
concerns. This was the case, in Grofcsik vs. Romania, where, according with provisions of ECHR judgment from 
2009, the European Union insisted again that the Romanian state had to adopt, without delay, the necessary 
measures to ensure coherent, accessible, fast and predictable functioning of the procedure, regulated by 
reparative laws, so that persons were entitled to obtain the proportional compensation with reference to the 
market value of properties. It could be observed that this created a vicious circle, capable of extending 
inconveniences so much that they might become problems of system affecting the trust and respect of litigants in 
national justice and, as indicated in the judgments of the ECHR (2008, 2009), the country’s determination to 
address the increasing influence of the European Courts.  
 Also, other difficulties might arise in terms of overlapping legislation and contradictions considering 
that, in some cases, the competences were not defined clearly or were contradictory and, in some texts of 
Romanian legislation, different names were used for the same element. 
Another difficulty was too much strict transposition of European Union legislation into Romanian 
legislation in the sense that, in most cases, the European Union legislation allowed some options for national 
transposition. However, often, the Romanian legislation opted for very strict minimum levels (high levels of 
control; high-level technical requirements, etc.). 
Once identified, a legal system’s causes and negative consequences, considered by the European Union 
and ECHR as being deficient, solutions could be found which would accelerate improvements to the functioning 
of the Romanian justice, and which, progressively, would eliminate the system’s momentary difficulties. The 
ECHR encouraged Romania to adopt means by which the current difficulties had to be settled. In the judgement’s 
reasoning in the case of Burdov vs. Russia, the ECHR interpreted Article 13, of the Convention, as meaning that 
it was the direct expression of the state's obligation, as provided for in Article 1 of the Convention to protect 
human rights, primarily in its own system of law. Therefore, this Article required Member States to implement 
internal effective means. Adopted laws had to be clear; unambiguous; uncontradictory; complete; coherent; and 
consistent. This was in the sense that there had to be a legal system, without loopholes of interpretation which 
provided a full dimension of time; of space; and applied the law to regulating the problem of law. Also the 
completion, of the relevant legislation, would facilitate greatly the citizens’ understanding and respect of the laws 
and would reduce the labour, invested in the courts, in resolving cases. This was, also, the European 
Commission’s vision, published in, in its July 2009 report which sent, to Romania, a series of recommendations 
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in the justice field. These included the adoption of codes of civil and criminal procedure and facilitation of entry. 
These four codes came into force by adopting and implementing legislation which would clarify the legislative 
framework. European Commission experts believed, also, that the adoption of numerous amendments and 
emergency ordinances made Romanian jurisprudence contradictory. However, there was no perfect system for 
new facts which were not included in the canons of written law of romano-germanic origin; specific rules; and of 
Romanian law. Therefore, according to the New Civil Code (2012), the law practitioner was obliged to appeal to 
the principles of law and to the rules of interpretation of the general theory of law. Recourse to European 
jurisprudence was an additional argument which showed that the national judges did not endanger national 
identity and democracy. On the contrary, the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts stimulated the principle of 
subsidiarity and protection of substantive and procedural law. In Jacot-Guillarmod’s (1993) opinion, this 
demanded that the national judge had an active role in a national procedural framework adapted to the 
requirements of European and international law.  
5. Conclusions 
In cases of incorrect legal transplantation of European Union rules, there was the possibility of a conflict 
between European Union law and national law; it could be solved only if one of them was given priority. 
European legislation did not contain an explicit regulation relating to this problem and none of the original 
Treaties addressed if the European norm was higher or lower of the national law’s norm. However, the only 
solution, to solve the conflict of laws, was to give priority to the norm of European law and allow it to cancel the 
effect of national regulations which diverged from European rule. According to the New Civil Code (2012), this 
would enable latter to replace the norm of law in the legal national system, The solution was imposed because, by 
any intrinsic value, a subordination of the European legal order, before national law, would be clearly European 
law. Obviously, in the latter case, it would be no longer an issue of an equal and uniform application of European 
law in all Member States and achieving the objectives, set by the Treaty, would become impossible to achieve. 
Consequently, it could retain the European law’s supremacy together with the direct effect. This was a 
fundamental element of juridical construction which, at European Union level, governed its activities. 
Consequently, if the relevant decisions, of the European Courts, were unknown, no law practitioner, who had to 
resolve a question of European law, could not say that this law was mastered. Allard and Garapon’s (2010) recent 
results indicated that, the idea which could occur, was that the national court, which was always at the center of 
national law and implicitly of international law, was not only the main factor of integration of European legal and 
application of European conventions but, also, of international conventions. Therefore, the national jurisprudence 
and, especially the European and international laws, were dynamic factors leading to efficient and effective 
harmonization of legislative procedures; of assimilation and implementation of European and international laws; 
and only a little in optimizing national law. 
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